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ELECTION DISCLOSURE LAWS: U.S.

SUPREME

COURT

HOLDS OHIO CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE LAW CANNOT BE APPLIED
CONSTITUTIONALLY TO MINOR POLITICAL PARTIES SHOWING

PROBABLE HARASSMENT - Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 103 S. Ct. 416 (1982).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee' belongs to
2
that line of cases, headed by the landmark decision Buckley v. Valeo,
which have decided the constitutionality (whether facial or "as applied") of federal and state election laws. Buckley is the most comprehensive interpretation of federal election law ever rendered by the Supreme Court.3
After the Watergate scandals, Congress adopted "unprecedented
restrictions on the federal electoral process in its 1974 amendments" to
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971"1 (FECA). Such restrictionsO on election campaigns, at both federal and state levels, regulate

1. 103 S.Ct. 416 (1982).
2. 424 U.S' 1 (1976). See infra note 8 and accompanying text for a description of the five
general Buckley holdings and infra notes 31-43 and accompanying text for an explanation of
Buckley's holdings regarding United States campaign disclosure requirements.
For an analysis of selected cases since Buckley, see Lansing & Sherman, The "'Evolution" of
the Supreme Court's PoliticalSpending Doctrine:Restricting CorporateContributions to Ballot

Measure Campaigns after Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, California, 8 J.
CORP.

L. 79 (1982); Note, 3 WHITrlER L. REV. 431 (1981).

3. Buckley ruled on the constitutionality of the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
4. Comment, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 171, 171-72 & n.1
(1976)(citing the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of tits. 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.)).
5. Comment, supra note 4, at 172 & n.2 (citing the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)(codified in scattered sections of tits. 2, 18, 47
U.S.C.)). The federal acts have since been amended. Note, 47 BROOKLYN L. REv. 861, 861 n.1
(1981)(citing Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 (FECA (1976)), Pub. L. No.
94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (codified in scattered sections of tits. 2, 26 U.S.C.)), and Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1979 (FECA (1979)), Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (codified
in scattered sections of tits. 2, 18, 26 U.S.C.)).
6. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended in 1974, sought to
accomplish five major election reforms in a comprehensive regulatory scheme. See generally
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1-2, app. at 144-235. See also Ifshen & Warin, Litigating the 1980 Presidential Election, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 487, 492-95 (1982).

First, FECA limited political contributions to candidates for federal elective office by individuals, groups, and political committees. Second, it limited expenditures by individuals or groups
associated with a candidate who is clearly identifiable, and also limited expenditures by the candidate himself and his or her family. Third, the Act required detailed disclosure of records of contri-
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political campaign activities to promote goals of "fairness and integrity

of the electoral process."'7 In this respect, the restrictions serve an important and legitimate government interest.
The Buckley case was a response to a comprehensive challenge to
the constitutionality of the 1974 FECA amendments. In Buckley, the

Court "partially dismantled the electoral reform program formulated
in the 1974 Amendments to the . . . Act of 1971."8 However, the
Buckley holding which is relevant to the Brown decision is the one upholding the constitutionality of the FECA's campaign financing disclos-

ure requirement. Commentators have stated that these disclosure requirements serve an important state interest "by guarding against
corruption and undue influence in the election of public officials." 9 The

butions and expenditures including names and addresses of contributors. Fourth, it created a commission to administer the record-keeping, disclosure, and investigatory functions of the Act. This
commission was given extensive rulemaking functions. Finally, the Act amended subtitle H of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide for public financing of presidential campaigns.
The Supreme Court in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) established and
upheld Congress' right to regulate election campaigns. Buckley set the limit on Congress' right.
See infra note 8.
7. Note, supra note 5, at 861 (citing the Senate Report that accompanied the FECA
(1971), S.REp. No. 229, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1821, 1821).
8. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Limitations on Contributions to Political Committees
in the 1976 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, 86 YALE L.J. 953, 953 (1977). For
other comprehensive and diverse analyses of Buckley, see Comment, supra note 4, and Comment,
Buckley v. Valeo: the Supreme Court and Federal Campaign Reform, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 852
(1976).
The Buckley Court responded to each of the five major election reforms described in note 6,
supra. In a per curiam opinion, the Court first held that the Act's limits on contributions were
constitutional. 424 U.S. at 23-38. Such limitations constituted an appropriate legislative means for
safeguarding the integrity of the election process without substantially burdening the first amendment rights of citizens to engage in political debate. Id. Second, the Court held the Act's expenditure provisions did violate the first amendment, id. at 39-59, because these provisions placed substantial burdens on the ability of citizens, associations, and candidates to engage in political
expression. Id. Third, the Court held that the Act's disclosure and record-keeping requirements
were constitutional. Id. at 60-84. It specifically rejected an overbreadth challenge to these provisions as they applied to minor parties and independent candidates and held that no blanket exemption from disclosure requirements was necessary for minor parties. Id. at 64-74. See also
Federal Election Comm'n v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d, 4i6, 421 (2d Cir.
1982), which discusses this portion of the Buckley decision. Fourth, it held the composition of the
Federal Elections Commission, except for its investigative and informative powers, violated art. II,
§ 2, cl.2 (the appointments clause) of the Constitution. 424 U.S. at 109-143.. Finally, the Court
held the scheme for the public financing of presidential campaigns was constitutional. Id. at 85109.
9. Note, supra note 5, at 861-62. Disclosure requirements, in effect, preserve the public's
right to know who supports which candidate for office. The Court has specifically upheld disclosure of contributions to political campaigns. See Burroughs, 290 U.S. 534, which upheld the disclosure requirements of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (repealed 1976), the predecessor to the FECA.
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CASENOTES

Ohio law 10 construed in Brown closely parallels the federal campaign
law in terms of disclosure and reporting requirements. 1
Although the Buckley Court refused to grant minor parties a blanket exemption from disclosure requirements, it established a test by
which a minor party could successfully challenge the constitutionality
of disclosure requirements as applied to that party.' Brown is the fruition of this case-by-case, "as applied" constitutional test regarding
campaign disclosure laws and minor political parties. Brown presents a
full evaluation of the conflict between the governmental interests in disclosure and the "well-established fundamental rights of privacy and
association.'I
Brown stands for the proposition that mandatory disclosure directly invades not only "a contributor's privacy of belief by exposing his
political affiliations,""' but a campaign expenditure recipient's privacy
as well. The Brown majority thus held that the Buckley test applied to
both contributors and recipients of campaign expenditures. Therefore,
Ohio's disclosure law was found unconstitutional as applied to both.
The dissent argued that the Buckley test was not met by the recipients
of expenditures from the Socialist Worker's Party. It is this disagreement on the issue of disclosure of recipients which constitutes the bulk
of the analysis in this casenote.

II. FACTS AND HOLDINGS
Brown began in 1974 as a class action suit instituted by members
of the Socialist Worker's Party (SWP) of Ohio in the District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio. 5 The Ohio SWP's suit challenged

10.
at 418.

11.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

See

§ 3517.01-.99 (Page 1972 & Supp. 1982). See also 103 S. Ct.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 3517.10 (Page Supp. 1982).

12. See infra text accompanying notes 20, 41.
13. Comment, Minor Political Parties and Campaign Disclosure Laws, 13 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 475, 475 (1978).
14. Id.
15. 103 S. Ct. at 418. "The plaintiff class as eventually certified included all SWP candi-

dates for political office in Ohio, their campaign committees and treasurers, and people who contribute to or receive disbursement from SWP campaign committees." Id. at 418 n.1 (emphasis
added). The United States Supreme Court characterized the SWP as
a small political party with approximately sixty members in the State of Ohio .

. .

. [Its

aim is 'the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a workers' government to
achieve socialism.' . . . [T]he SWP does not advocate the use of violence. It seeks instead
to achieve social change through the political process, and its members regularly run for
public office.
Id. at 418. The Court went on to note the SWP had "had little success at the polls. In 1980 ..
the Ohio SWP's candidate for the United States Senate received fewer than . . . 1.9% of the total
vote." Id. Further, its "[c]ampaign contributions and expenditures in Ohio have averaged about
$15,000 annually since 1974." Id.
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"the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions of the Ohio Campaign
Expense Reporting Law." ' These provisions require "every candidate
for political office to file a statement identifying each contributor and
each recipient of a disbursement of campaign funds. ' 17 The suit maintained that such disclosure" would subject SWP members to harass16. Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.01-.99 (Page 1972 & Supp. 1982).
17. 103 S. Ct. at 418 (emphasis added). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.10 (Page Supp.
1982), provides in relevant part:
(A) Every campaign committee, political committee, and political party which made
or received a contribution or made an expenditure in connection with" the nomination or
election of any candidate at any election held in this state shall file, on a form prescribed
under this section, a full, true, and itemized statement, made under penalty of election
falsification, setting forth in detail the contributions and expenditures.
(B) Each statement required by division (A) of this section shall contain the following
information:
(4) A statement of contributions made or received, which shall include:
(a) The month, date and year of contribution;
(b) The full name and address of each person, including any chairman or treasurer
thereof if other than an individual, from whom contributions are received. The requirement
of filing the full address does not apply to any statement filed by a state or local committee
of a political party, to a finance committee of such committee, or to a committee recognized by a state or local committee as its fund-raising auxiliary.
(c) A description of the contribution received, if other than money;
(d) The value in dollars and cents of the contribution;
(e) All contributions and expenditures shall be itemized separately regardless of the
amount except a receipt of a contribution from a person in the sum of twenty-five dollars or
less at one social or fund-raising activity. An account of the total contributions from each
such social or fund-raising activity shall be listed separately, together with the expenses
incurred and paid in connection with such activity. No continuing association which makes
a contribution from funds which are derived solely from regular dues paid by members of'
the association shall be required to list the name of address of any members who paid such
dues.
(5) A statement of expenditures which shall include:
(a) The month, day, and year of expenditure;
(b) The full name and address of each person to whom the expenditure was made,
including any chairman or treasurer thereof if a committee, association, or group of
persons;
(c) The object or purpose for which the expenditure was made;
(d) The amount of each expenditure.
(C). . .All such statements shall be open to public inspection in the office where they
are filed, and shall be carefully preserved for a period of at least six years.
If the candidate is running for a statewide office, the statement shall be filed with the Ohio
secretary of state; otherwise, the statement shall be filed with the appropriate county board of
elections. See id. § 3517.11(a).
The federal law is analogous. Those parts of the United States Code reviewed by the Court in
Buckley "require each political committee to keep detailed records of both contributions and expenditures, including the names of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements, and to file reports with the Federal Election Commission which are made available to the
public." 103 S. Ct. at 420 n.7 (construing 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 434, 438 (1982)).
18. Note especially that the Ohio statute requires that the "object or purpose" of each dishttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/8
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ment and would therefore violate SWP members' first amendment
rights of association and belief. 9 By this challenge, the plaintiffs
sought to meet the test established in Buckley which held that "the

First Amendment prohibits the government from compelling disclosure
by a minor political party that can show a 'reasonable probability' that
the compelled disclosures will subject those identified to 'threats, harassment, or reprisals.' "20
The defendants in the class action, and later the appellants before
the United States Supreme Court, were Ohio's secretary of state
(Brown) and other state and local officials responsible for administering
the state's disclosure law. 21 The lower court trial was finally held in
February, 198122 before a three-judge federal district court panel.2 3
During the period between 1974 and the trial, the SWP did not disclose either the names of its contributors or the names of the recipients
of its campaign disbursements; it complied with the statute in all other
respects.2

The district court reviewed the "'substantial evidence of both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of SWP members and supporters.'

"20

It concluded, under Buckley, that the Ohio

bursement must be disclosed. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.10(B)(5)(c) (Page Supp. 1982).
Note also that the lists of names and addresses of contributors and recipients are open to public
inspection for at least six years. See id. § 3517.10(C). There is a fine of up to $1000 a day for
violating Ohio's disclosure requirements. Id. § 3517.99.
19. 103 S. Ct. at 423.
20. Id. (citing 424 U.S. at 74).
21. 103 S. Ct. at 418 n.l.
22. In November 1974, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio issued a temporary restraining order. This barred Ohio from enforcing its disclosure requirements against the
SWP until the case could be determined on its merits. The effect of this order was to postpone any
period of violation of the disclosure laws by the plaintiff until the case could be decided by the
three-judge panel. Id. at 418-19.
The case was then transferred to the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. In
February, 1975, that court entered an identical order. A period of extensive discovery followed
until the three-judge court convened. Id. at 419.
23. This court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976). Although §
2281 was repealed in 1976, the repeal was not applicable to actions commenced prior to August
12, 1976. Id.
24. 103 S. Ct. at 419.
25. Id. (citing Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. v. Brown, No. C-2-75-95 (S.D. Ohio
June 25, 1981) (available Sept. 4, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file)) [hereinafter all
references to the district court opinion will be cited to S. Ct.]. In the trial, the plaintiffs had
"introduced proof of specific incidents" of such hostility. 103 S. Ct. at 423. These incidents included threatening phone calls, burning of SWP literature, destruction of SWP property, police
harassment of their candidate, and the firing of shots at one SWP office. There was also evidence
of SWP members being fired from jobs because of their party membership. The district court
found this evidence amply supported its conclusion regarding hostility. Id. at 423-24.
The court also found a "past history of government harassment," including FBI surveillance
of the party until at least 1976, and an FBI counterintelligence program against the party and its
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disclosure requirements had been applied unconstitutionally to the
26
plaintiffs.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. In Brown, the Court crystallized an example of when and how
campaign disclosure laws cannot be constitutionally applied to a minor
political party. The Court framed the issue as "whether certain disclosure requirements of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law...
can be constitutionally applied to the Socialist Workers Party, a minor
political party which historically has been the object of harassment by
government officials and private parties. 2 7 Then, employing the Buckley test 28 as the district court had done, the Court concluded that the
"Ohio statute is unconstitutional as applied" to the SWP.29
The Supreme Court held "that the test announced in Buckley for
safeguarding the First Amendment interests of minor parties and their
members and supporters applies not only to the compelled disclosure of
campaign contributors but also to the compelled disclosure of recipients
of campaign disbursements."30

youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). Id. at 424. This program included disclosure of
members' past criminal records and the distribution of FBI reports to the armed services intelligence groups, the United States Secret Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Id.
The district court "specifically found the FBI had conducted surveillance of the Ohio SWP
and had interferred with its activities within the State." Id. The court found that the government
possessed 8,000,000 documents relating to the SWP and YSA, and, since 1960, had paid its informants over $350,000 for their services and expenses relating to the SWP. Id. at 424 n.18. The
district court obtained this information from "Part I of the Final Report of Special Master Judge
Breitel in Socialist Workers Party, et al v. The Attorney General of the United States, 73 Civ.
3160 (TPG) (SDNY February 4, 1980), detailing the United States Government's admissions
concerning the existence and nature of the Government surveillance of the SWP." Id. at 424 n.17.
26. The evidence caused the district court to conclude that there was reasonable probability
that recipients and contributors of the SWP would be subject to harassment, threats and reprisals
if their names were disclosed. Id. at 424 n.19. The court found the harassment "ingrained and
likely to continue." Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
The district court held that the Ohio statute was unconstitutional as applied to the Ohio
SWP. See id. at 419. It did not decide the statute was facially invalid, which the plaintiffs had
claimed. The plaintiffs had based this claim on the absence of a monetary threshold in the Ohio
law. Id. at 419 n.6. The statute compelled disclosure of even nominal amounts of contributions
and expenditures. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.10(B)(4)(e) (Page Supp. 1982).
27. 103 S. Ct. at 418.
28. Id. at 423 (citing 424 U.S. at 74).
29. 103 S. Ct. at 418.
30. Id. at 423 (emphasis added). Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices Burger, Brennan, White, and Powell joined him. Justice Blackmun joined in Parts I, III, and
IV of the opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Blackmun preferred
to assume that the flexible proof rule of Buckley applied to force disclosure of contributions and
expenditures equally, rather than to hold such. Id. at 425. Justice O'Connor concurred in part and
dissented in part. Justice O'Connor opined that Ohio's disclosure requirements regarding expenditures did meet the strict scrutiny test and were constitutional. Id. at 428. Justices Rehnquist and
Stevens joined Justice O'Connor.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/8
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III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Background

Buckley v. Valeol1 is clearly the foundation for Brown. Most relevant, for purposes of this casenote, is the Buckley Court's position on
the first amendment challenge to the reporting and disclosure require33
ments 32 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). The
Buckley Court upheld the constitutionality of these disclosure requirements.3 4 It did so on the basis of three governmental interests which it
found sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny, 35 when measured against
the burden placed on fundamental first amendment rights of association and belief by the FECA requirements.
The three governmental interests which the Court considered sufficient to subordinate one's first amendment rights were: 1) providing the
voting public with information about where campaign dollars came
3
from and how they are spent by the candidate, 2) deterring "actual
corruption" and avoiding "the appearance of corruption by exposing
37
large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity," and 3)
8
gathering the date necessary to detect violations of the FECA*A
Although the Court upheld the FECA's disclosure requirements,
the Court noted the balance in favor of the government's interest will
tip against "disclosure when it is required of contributors to certain

31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
32. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 434, 438 (1976).
33. See Comment, supra note 4.
34. 424 U.S. at 60-74.
35. Id. See also id. at 64-65 (to compel disclosure requires that any subordinating state
interest must survive an "exacting scrutiny" test). The Court also insisted there "be a ... 'substantial relation' between the governmental interest and the information to be disclosed." Id. at 64
(citations omitted).
The Buckley Court held that strict scrutiny of the disclosure law was necessary, even though
the government's conduct requiring disclosure only indirectly and unintentionally deterred the
exercise of first amendment rights. Id. at 65 (citation omitted).
The Court completed its strict scrutiny analysis by holding that "disclosure requirements--certainly in most applications-appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the
evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist." Id. at 68 (citation
omitted). See also id. at 68 n.82 (Court's explanation of the importance of preelection disclosure).
36. 424 U.S. at 66 (citing H.R. REP. No. 564, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971)).
37. 424 U.S. at 67-68. See S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974); H.R. REP. No.
564, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971).
"Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said

to be the best of disinfectants ....

" 424 U.S. at 67 (quoting L.

BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S

62 (National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933)). See Burroughs v. U.S., 290 U.S. 534,
548 (1934) (Congress could reasonably conclude that full disclosure can "prevent the corrupt use
of money to affect election.").
38. 424 U.S. at 67-68. The Brown Court found this "government interest in enforcing limitations [to be] completely inapplicable . . . since the Ohio law imposes no limitations on the
103 S. Ct. at 420 n.8.
contributions."
of campaign
amount by
Published
eCommons,
1983
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parties and candidates." 9 In this statement, the Buckley Court laid the
0
groundwork for Brown.4
Although the Buckley Court refused to carve out a flat exemption
for minor parties, it established a test for determining when the FECA
(and analogous state-level) disclosure requirements might be unconstitutional when applied to minor parties: "The evidence offered need
show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a

party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment or
reprisals from either Government officials or private parties."' 41

In designing this test, the Court acknowledged that it was a

"heavy burden of proof"' 2 for a minor party to show that such harassment was directly attributable to specific disclosure requirements.
Therefore, the Court held that it would allow sufficient flexibility in the
proof of injury to meet the Court's test.'3 Although the proof is flexible,
the minor party still carries the burden of production and persuasion to
show its rights of association and belief outweigh any substantial government interests. This is the burden the Brown Court held that the
44

SWP met.
B.

Brown Court Rationale
Relying on a series of critical cases cited in Buckley," the Brown

39. 424 U.S. at 68.
40. The Court envisioned a case, similar to those before it in "NAACP v. Alabama, and
Bates, where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights is so serious and the state
interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial that the Act's requirements cannot be constitutionally applied." Id. at 71. The Buckley Court specifically discussed allegations which had been
made by a branch of the Socialist Workers Party in a civil action seeking to declare the District of
Columbia's disclosure and filing requirements unconstitutional as applied to its records. Those
allegations were sufficient "to withstand a motion to dismiss in Doe v. Martin, 404 F. Supp. 753
(1975) (three-judge court)." Id. at 71 n.87. The District of Columbia had required political committees to record contributions of $10 or more and to report contributors of $50 or more. Id.
Although the Court found the Buckley appellants had not "tendered the record evidence of
the sort proffered in NAACP v. Alabama," id. at 71, and it could not find, therefore, the disclosure requirements unconstitutional, it was clearly foreseeing such a case. Brown is the fruition of
the Court's vision.
41. 424 U.S. at 74.
42. Id.
43. Id. The Court held that such flexibility would assure fair consideration of a minor
party's claim. The Court stated:
The proof may include, for example, specific evidence of past or present harassment of
members due to their associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization
itself. A pattern of threats or specific manifestations of public hostility may be sufficient.
New parties that have no history upon which to draw may be able to offer evidence of
reprisals and threats directed against individuals or organizations holding similar views. Id.
44. 103 S. Ct. at 425.
45. These key cases and the United States Supreme Court's holdings in each are as follows:
I) In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963), the Court held it
was unconstitutional for the Florida legislature to require the president of a local NAACP chapter
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/8
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Court first traced the principles underlying the rights of association and

belief. It opened its opinion with the statement that "[t]he Constitution
protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations and
beliefs. Such disclosures 'can seriously infringe on privacy of associa-

tion and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.' ",46 The Court
then related the right to privacy (against disclosure) with the right to
associate

by

citing

NAACP

v.

Alabama, which

stated

that

"[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs."'4 7 The Brown Court
indicated that it would apply the strict scrutiny test to its evaluation of
the SWP's rights of association.4
The state interests which the Brown Court weighed against the
burden placed on the SWP's associational rights were two of the three

interests identified in Buckley: "enhancement of voters' knowledge
about a candidate's possible allegiances and interests, [and] deterrence
of corruption . . . ."9 Referencing Buckley, the Brown Court did not

find knowledge of a candidate's allegiance to be a subordinating state
interest because minor party candidates usually have viewpoints wellknown and publicized. 50 Again referencing Buckley, the Brown Court

did not find prevention of corruption a subordinating interest because
the improbability of a minor party winning reduces the dangers of cor-

to divulge his membership list for two reasons. First, it violated rights of association protected by
the first and fourteenth amendments. Second, the state had failed to show a substantial relation
between the information sought and an overriding and compelling state interest; 2) In NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court held that the NAACP's effort to challenge racial discrimination was a mode of expression and association and that Virginia's attempt to stop such efforts,
by broadening its statutory definition of legal malpractice, violated first and fourteenth amendment rights of association; 3) In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), the Court held that an
Arkansas statute which required teachers to file an affidavit listing every organization to which
they belonged was a violation of their right of association; 4) In Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516 (1960), the Court held that city tax ordinances which required compulsory disclosure of membership lists of local NAACP branches significantly interfered with freedom of association and
that the government demonstrated no interest which justified such a substantial abridgment of
associational freedom; 5) In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Court held that a
compelled disclosure of the NAACP's membership lists would likely constitute an effective restraint on freedom of association.
46. 103 S. Ct. at 419-20 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64).
47. 357 U.S. at 462.
48. This indication comes from the Court's statement that "[tihe right to privacy in one's
political associations and beliefs will yield only to 'a subordinating interest of the state [that is]
compelling' . . . and then only if there is a 'substantial relationship between the information
sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest'." 103 S. Ct. at 420 (citations omitted).
49. Id. See also 424 U.S. at 67-68 (government's interest inapplicable in enforcing contribution limits).
S. Ct. at 420.1983
50. by
103eCommons,
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ruption. 5 ' Therefore, the Brown Court concluded that "government interests in compelling disclosure are 'diminished' in the case of minor
parties." 52
Yet, while the Government's interests were diminished, the Brown
Court found "the potential for impairing First Amendment interests is
substantially greater."" The Brown Court underscored the Buckley
Court's description of this danger to minor parties:
We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of minor parties and their members and to supporters of
independents could be significant. These movements are less likely to

have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in
contributions. In some instances fears of-reprisals may deter contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent
reduction in the free circulation of ideas both within and without the
political arena.54
Therefore, the Brown majority concluded that the SWP could not
constitutionally be compelled to disclose either its campaign contributors or its campaign disbursement recipients. In sum, the Brown Court
found the Ohio SWP had met its burden of proof regarding probable
harassment. Further, the Court held the first amendment protects the
SWP's rights of association and belief for both contributors and
55
recipients.
It is on the issue of disclosure of recipients that the Brown majority and dissent differ. 56 Initially the appellants, Ohio state officials, contended that "the [Buckley] test had no application to the compelled
disclosure of names of recipients of campaign disbursements.157 Justice
O'Connor softened this sweeping statement by agreeing with the majority that the -appellants overstated their argument in declaring this,
and that Buckley's broad concerns did indeed apply to disclosure of
recipients.58
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor found "important differences between the disclosure of contributors and disclosure of recipients of cam-

51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70).
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71 (citations omitted)).
55. 103 S.Ct. at 423.
56. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens joined, concurred
in part (regarding disclosure of contributions) and dissented in part (regarding disclosure of recipients of campaign expenditures). Id. at 428-32.
57. Id. at 421 (emphasis added in part).
58. Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
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paign expenditures."" These differences indicate that she also questioned whether the recipient issue should even have been before the
Court. Justice O'Connor made this determination by noting that although the Buckley Court did rule on an overbreadth challenge to the
FECA's disclosure requirements "as they apply to contributions to minor parties," the appellants in Buckley had not challenged the application of disclosure requirements to the expenditures of minor parties.60
Therefore, she concluded that the Buckley Court had not directly considered any first amendment interests of minor parties relating to the
disclosure of who received their expenditures,"1 thus indicating the recipient question was not properly before the Brown Court.
In response, Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, asserted
that "the question whether the Buckley test applies to the compelled
disclosure of recipients of expenditures is properly before us.""2 The

59. Id. at 429.
60. Id. at 428 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68-69 (emphasis added)). In a footnote, Justice O'Connor explained the Buckley plaintiffs had, however, challenged expenditure limits and
disclosure requirements for independent contributions and expenditures. Of course, the Buckley
Court "upheld all disclosure requirements, including disclosure of independent expenditures
[made] 'for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate.'" 103 S. Ct. at 428 n.l(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80). In a point perhaps too finely
drawn, she pointed out that the plaintiffs did not challenge expenditure recipient disclosure for all
political parties (versus individual independent expenditures). 103 S. Ct. at 428 n.l.
61. Justice O'Connor argued at length that the Buckley test "contemplates only assessing
possible harassment of contributors,without a word about considering the harassment of recipients of expenditures if their names are disclosed or any effects this harassment may have on the
party." Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 421 n.9. Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
argued that the Court should "leave for another day" the question of whether the "flexible proof
rule of Buckley. . .applies equally to forced disclosure of contributions and to forced disclosure
of expenditures." Id. at 425. Justice Blackmun would "merely assume for the purposes of [the]
present decision" that it does. Id. This is because the appellants' jurisdictional statement (presentation of its issue) only assumed the "applicability of Buckley to the entire case." Id. at 426. The
appellants presented the issue as follows:
'Whether, under the standards set forth by this Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 ...
(1976), the provisions of Sections 3517.10 and 3517.11 of the Ohio Revised Code, which
require that the campaign committee of a candidate for public office file a report disclosing
the full names and addresses of persons making contributions to or receiving expenditures
from such committee, are consistent with the right of privacy of association guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States when applied to the committees of candidates of a minority party which can establish only isolated
instances of harassment directed toward the organization or its members within Ohio during recent years.'
Id. at 425-26 (emphasis added).
Supreme Court Rules state: "'Only the question set forth in the jurisdictional statement or
fairly included therein will be considered by the Court.'" Sup. CT.R. 15.1(a), cited in id. at 425.
However, Buckley did not address the recipient issue. Therefore, Blackmun's concern is that
"[albsent extraordinary circumstances, [the] Court does not decide issues beyond those it has
agreed to review." Id. at 436. The appellants had asked for application of the Buckley test; the
Published
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majority based this belief, first, on the fact that Ohio had maintained
throughout the litigation that it could constitutionally require disclosure of contributors and recipients. In turn, at the district court level,
the court had held that the Buckley standard of "flexible proof of reasonable probability of threats" 68 could apply to both. It found the
SWP's evidence was sufficient to show "disclosure would subject both
contributors and recipients to . . . harassment." 64 Therefore, when the
case reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that due to the correctness of the lower court's holding, both the contributor and recipient
issues were "fairly included" in the appellants' question (jurisdictional
statement) presented to it.' 5 The majority, therefore, refused to discard
the recipient issue, even though the Court's rationale for reviewing it
appears somewhat self-serving.
Apparently conceding, then, that the "broad concerns of Buckley
apply to the required disclosure of recipients of campaign expenditures,"'6 6 Justice O'Connor nevertheless found that the SWP "failed to
carry its burden of. showing there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of recipients of expenditures will subject the recipients themselves or the SWP to threats, harassment, or reprisals," 67 thus chilling
their first amendment right of association. Furthermore, she noted "the
strong public interest in fair and honest elections outweighs any damage done to the associational rights of the party."68 For Justice
O'Connor and the dissent, in the strict scrutiny equation which balances governmental interests against first amendment rights, the gov-

voked the Court's jurisdiction "to review specifically the proper standard for disclosure of campaign expenditures." Id. He also felt the case presented "no extraordinary circumstances justifying deviation from [the] Court's Rule." Id. at 427.
Blackmun's conditioned concurrence and the dissent's argument regarding the Court's holding on recipients are not too far removed from the criticisms the dissent leveled on the majority in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Wade, the dissent accused the majority of "an exercise of
raw judicial power" by creating and upholding the fundamental right to privacy over the state's
interest in the preservation of life. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 n.*, 222 (1973).
63. 103 S. Ct. at 421 n.9.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing SuP. CT. R. 15.1(a) and Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 559 n.6
(1978), for the proposition that its "power to decide [was] not limited by the precise terms of the
question presented.").
The majority found the appellants' and the dissent's attempts to limit the minor party exemption to laws which require disclosure of only contributors to be inconsistent with the rationale of
Buckley which recognized the potential for a minority party exemption from disclosure requirements. 103 S. Ct. at 421.
66. Id. at 428.
67. Id. Justice O'Connor found "no direct evidence of harassment of either contributors or
recipients of expenditures." Id. at 431. Rather, she noted that "the evidence concerns harassment
and reprisals of visible party members, including violence at party headquarters and loss of jobs."
Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 428.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/8
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ernment interests won. 69
On the fundamental rights side of the strict scrutiny equation, Justice O'Connor did not find the right to association sufficiently chilled or
endangered to warrant nondisclosure of recipients' names. Regarding
proof of harassment of recipients, although the Justice was willing to
accept that harassment of party members supports the conclusion "that
there will be a reasonable probability of harassment of contributors if
their names are disclosed," 0 she was unwilling to infer that disclosure
of recipients would lead to harassment of recipients.7 1 Apparently, she
could visualize how contributors might suffer-as SWP members
do--from disclosure, but could not visualize how a recipient of SWP
funds might suffer in the same way.
The Justice herself acknowledged that associational rights of mi73
nor parties are sensitive and that the Buckley Court emphasized this.
She found contributions to a campaign to be a form of political expression, so that disclosure of such contributions "implicates the contributors' associational rights."'7 4 Yet the Justice also found disclosure of recipients of expenditures would "have a lesser impact on a minority
party's First Amendment interests than will disclosure of contribu-

69. In strong terms, Justice O'Connor pointed out the "governmental interest in disclosure
of expenditures remains significant for minor parties." Id. at 429. She reiterated that the "purpose
of requiring parties to disclose expenditures is to deter improper influencing of voters." Id. She
cited the many forms which corruption can take. Although she found that improper minor party
practices were unlikely to elect a candidate, she feared such practices could "determine the outcome of the election of other candidates." Id. Therefore, to her, "the requirement of a full and
verifiable report of expenditures is important in deterring such practices, for otherwise the party
could hide the improper transactions through an accounting sleight-of-hand." Id. The majority
disagreed completely.
70. Id. at 431.
71. Justice O'Connor found the evidence of harassment of party members "sufficiently
linked to disclosure of contributors in large part because any person publicly known to support the
SWP's unpopular ideological position may suffer the reprisals that this record shows active party
members suffer, and disclosure of contributors may lead the public to presume these people support the party's ideology." Id.
72. 103 S. Ct. at 431. Justice O'Connor was unwilling to draw this analogy for recipients.
She found that the record "does not suggest that disclosure of recipients of expenditures would
lead to harassment or reprisals to the party or its members." Id. She found the majority of expenditures would be for business transactions like office supplies, and that there was "virtually no
evidence that disclosure . . .will impair the SWP's ability to obtain needed services." Id. She
brushed off the effect on campaign workers by saying they have already publicly demonstrated
their support for the party. Finally, Justice O'Connor was willing to accept the contention that the
"FBI's actions against the SWP have long been ended, . . . and Congress has since instituted
more rigorous oversight of [the] FBI ...." Id. at 431 n.9 (citation omitted). She was, however,
unwilling to infer from past FBI incidents that "disclosure of recipients of expenditures would
increase any difficulty the party might have . . .and is plainly outweighed by the 'substantial
public interest in disclosure.'" id. (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 428-29.
74. by
Id.eCommons,
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tors."' 75 Justice O'Connor discounted the impact of disclosure on business transactions, and also on party workers by stating that "[o]nce an
individual has openly shown his close ties to the organization by
campaigning for it, disclosure of receipt of expenditures is unlikely to
increase the degree of harassment so significantly as to deter the individual from campaigning for the party."17 1
Justice O'Connor appears to disregard the fact that not all campaign workers make their party affiliation known to the public. Many
do nothing more than anonymously answer phones or address envelopes. Likewise, a close analogy might be drawn between contributing
services-with a minimal reimbursement for expenses-and contributing dollars, which the Justice readily admitted is protected by the first
amendment. Therefore, the majority, and by implication, the dissent,
rightly argued that both appellants in this case "seriously understate
the threat to First Amendment rights that would result from requiring
minor parties to disclose the recipients of campaign disbursements."' 7
On the governmental interest side of the equation, Justice
O'Connor found that "unlike the government's interest in disclosure of
contributions, its interest in disclosure of expenditures does not decrease significantly for small parties.178 She predicted that even parties
with a small chance of political success might nonetheless finance improper or corrupt activities to achieve recognition.79

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 422. The majority noted:
Expenditures by a political party often consist of reimbursements, advances, or wages
paid to party members, campaign workers, and supporters, whose activities lie at the very
,core of the First Amendment. Disbursement may also go to persons who choose to express
their support for an unpopular cause by providing services rendered scarce by public hostility and suspicion. Should their involvement be publicized, these persons would be as vulnerable to threats, harassment, and reprisals as are contributors whose connection with the
party is solely financial. Even individuals who receive disbursements for 'merely' commercial transactions may be deterred by the public enmity attending publicity, and those seeking to harass may disrupt commercial activities on the basis of expenditure information.
Because an individual who enters into a transaction with a minor party purely for commercial reasons lacks any ideological commitment to the party, such an individual may well be
deterred from providing services by even a small risk of harassment. Compelled disclosure
of the names of such recipients of expenditures could therefore cripple a minor party's
ability to operate effectively and thereby reduce 'the free circulation of ideas both within
and without the political arena.'
Id. at 422-23 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 429.
79. Id. Justice O'Connor recognized, relying upon Buckley, that knowing who the contributors to a minor party were did not significantly increase the voter's ability to identify the ideology
of a minor party candidate, since his stance was usually well known. Nor did identifying contributors prevent "buying" an election, since it was improbable that any minor candidate would win an
election. Id. Therefore, she would agree that "these two major government interests in disclosure
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/8
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In responding to Justice O'Connor's argument, the majority determined that she had mistakenly relied on Justice White's concurring
opinion in Buckley, 80 in which he stated "unlimited money tempts people to spend it on whatever money can buy to influence an election." 81
When the majority examined the context in which White made his
comment, it found his observation indicated precisely why the state's
interest in preventing corruption was insubstantial in the case of
recipients.
The majority noted that Justice White in Buckley was addressing
ceilings on campaign expenditures,8 2 not disclosure of them. His "point
was that such ceilings 'could play a substantial role in preventing unethical practices.'"88 Where minor parties are concerned, however,
their limited resources function as an automatic expenditure ceiling,
which "minimizes the likelihood" that they will finance improper activities. 4 Finding Justice White's observation "particularly apposite in the
case of minor parties," 85 the majority found that it could not agree
"that minor parties are as likely as major parties to [fund] . . .dirty
tricks." 8 The essential reason for this position was that there was simply not enough money to finance corrupt activities.
A more important point for the majority was that "the mere possibility that minor parties will resort to corrupt or unfair tactics cannot
justify the substantial infringement on First Amendment interests that
would result from compelling the disclosure of recipients of expenditures."' 87 In Buckley, the Brown Court recalled, it had acknowledged
that a major party candidate's supporters "might channel money into
minor parties to divert votes from other major party contenders." 88
Therifore, it recognized the distorting influence of large contributors.

of contributions are significantly reduced for minor parties." Id.

She found, however, "the governmental interest in disclosure of expenditures remains significant for minor parties." Id. She noted that the purpose of requiring an expenditure disclosure was
to deter any wrongful influence of voters. She recognized the many forms corruption of the electoral process could take, including dirty tricks and slush funds. She acknowledged that such tricks
were unlikely to bring a minor party success, but felt minor parties were as tempted as major
parties to resort to such impermissible actions. For Justice O'Connor, the possibility that votes
thus deflected might affect an election outcome was enough to justify a "full and verifiable report
of expenditures [to deter] such practices." Id.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 422 n. II (questioning Justice O'Connor's dissent, 103 S. Ct. at 429 n.4).
81. 424 U.S. at 265.
82. 103 S.Ct. at 422 n.ll.
83. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 265).
84. Id. Recall the Ohio SWP averaged $15,000 each election year to spend for campaigns.
Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. by
Id.eCommons,
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Nevertheless, the Brown Court noted that in Buckley it also had held
minor parties were exempt from disclosure requirements regarding contributors where they could "show a reasonable probability of harassment."' 9 Now in Brown, the majority similarly concluded that the government interest requiring disclosure of recipients was also
"substantially reduced in the case of minor parties." 90 Therefore, the
Court held "the minor party exemption recognized in Buckley applies
to compelled disclosure of expenditures as well.""
In summary, "heightened government interest in disclosure of expenditures"9 and the reduced impact on minor parties' first amendment associational interests prompted the dissent to "uphold the constitutionality of those portions of the Ohio statute that require the SWP
to disclose the recipients of expenditures."" It was plain to the dissent
that the appellees failed to carry the flexible burden of proof enunciated in Buckley when challenging the expenditure-disclosing provisions.
It was, however, not at all plain to the majority that the SWP had
failed. For the majority, the first amendment prohibited a state from
compelling any disclosures by a minor party. Therefore, seeing "substantial evidence of past and present hostility from private persons and
government officials against the SWP,"' the majority held that
"Ohio's campaign disclosure requirements cannot constitutionally be
applied to the Ohio SWP."9 5
The majority's position, that disclosure of both contributors' and
recipients' names is unconstitutional as applied to minor parties, is now
law. It is also the stronger argument. Disclosure intrudes upon fundamental rights." While it affects all political campaign contributors and
recipients, it has an even "greater impact upon . . . minor political

parties which are by nature small and unpopular." 9 The Brown
Court's findings regarding harassment of SWP members are persuasive
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

422 n.ll.

430 (emphasis added).
432 (footnote omitted).
425.

95. Id.
96. Comment, supra note 13, at 475-76. This comment criticized the Buckley Court's refusal to create a categorical constitutional exemption for minority parties from the FECA's reporting requirements, and the Court's requirement that minor parties show "on a case-by-case
basis a sufficient burden on first amendment rights to merit an exemption." Id. at 477. At that
time, the comment's author felt the Court had given insufficient weight to contributors' interests
and had "been overly deferential to congressional judgments." Id. (citation omitted). The author
should feel vindicated to the extent that the Brown Court favored not only contributors' interests
but expenditure recipients' interests as well.
97. Id.
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evidence of this. 8
The Brown majority, in agreeing with the district court's opinion,
inferred from evidence about harassment of members that there was a
"reasonable probability that disclosing the names of contributors and
recipients will subject them to . . .harassment." 9 It would appear to
be inconsistent to infer harassment of one group and not the other, as
the dissent was willing to do.
Ohio's disclosure law makes it "particularly easy to identify [recipients] since it requires disclosure of the purpose of disbursements as
well as the identity of the recipients."10 0 Whether one contributes or
receives SWP funds in Ohio it "results in a dramatic increase in public
exposure." 101 Records of a person's affiliation with the SWP (in contributor or recipient form).are kept open to inspection by anyone for at
least six years.10 2 The majority is only being realistic when it finds
"preservation of unorthodox political affiliation in public records substantially increases the potential for harassment above and beyond the
risk that an individual faces simply as a result of having worked for an
unpopular party at one time."108
The dissent is unrealistic in holding that disclosure of recipients of
SWP funds will have a lesser impact on associational rights. One fanatic with a vendetta against the SWP or anyone affiliated with it, having public access to complete records of SWP contributors and recipients, could commit mayhem. The dissent is also unrealistic in believing
that FBI-type surveillance of groups like the SWP has ended. 1 4 The
dissent may be correct in holding that the Buckley Court did not provide that its test was applicable to recipients. This is a distinction too
finely drawn where harassment threatens such a chilling effect on associational rights.
The majority's argument concerning reduced governmental interests is also stronger than the dissent's. Not only does it make a clear
case for the remoteness of influential corruptions in minor party expenditures, it also refutes part of the dissent's basis for holding governmental interests to be heightened when it finds Justice White's observa-

98. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
99. 103 S. Ct. at 424.
100. Id. at 422 n.12 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.10(B)(5)(c) (Page Supp.
1982)).
101. 103 S. Ct. at 423 n.14.
102. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.10(C) (Page Supp. 1982)).
103. 103 S. Ct. at 423 n.14.
104. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 678
F.2d 416, 417-18 (2d Cir. 1982) (Communist Party was exempt from disclosure and record-keeping requirements of the FECA because the compelled disclosure of names of contributors would
subject by
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tions in Buckley apposite.
The majority applies strict scrutiny to the Ohio disclosure laws
and finds them unconstitutional as applied to both contributors and recipients. In the face of substantial first amendment rights it finds no
10 5
compelling government interest sufficient to subordinate those rights.
Its reasoning is clear, its findings of facts are sufficient to support its
contention, and its conclusion is thus compelled. That the Buckley
Court did not specifically address recipients of minor party expenditures, although it addressed independent expenditures, is not a sufficient reason to hold otherwise.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Brown represents the classic application of the Buckley test to a
minor political party, with a twist that protects recipients of campaign
funds as well as contributors. The factual pattern of Brown clearly
shows when a minor party will have sufficiently demonstrated reasonable probability of harassment so as to prevent disclosure of those affiliated with it.
Holding any law requiring such disclosure unconstitutional when
applied to a minor party preserves that party's fundamental first
amendment rights of association and belief. Where the strict scrutiny
test is applied to state laws requiring disclosure of a minor party's contributors and recipients, the government's interest is diminished and the
threat to first amendment rights is sufficient enough to exempt the parties from such requirements. Any minor party seeking such relief
should look to the flexible burden of proof the Ohio SWP met in Brown
to find the guidelines for presenting its own case.
Tricia A. Suttmann

105. See 103 S. Ct. at 420.
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